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This paper analyses the role of finance capital in regional economic development. A cost-benefit
approach is invoked in order to estimate the welfare impacts of a regional loan and guarantee
program for small firms in Israel. Program-created employment is treated as a benefit and an
employment account that separates net from gross employment, is presented.  An estimate of net
wage benefits is then derived. This involves adjusting wages across different earnings classes in order
to account for the variation in opportunity costs of labor at different levels. The estimation of costs
includes the opportunity costs of capital, administration, default and  tax-raising costs. Results point
to substantial regional welfare effects. We stress the need to account for changing regional economic
structure in this kind of evaluation framework.
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management.1. INTRODUCTION
The provision of finance capital to small firms (in the form of loans, grants, guarantees etc.) is a
standard prescription for jump-starting regional economic growth. Assessments of  this approach to
regional growth are usually couched in terms of the employment gains, increased investment and
income that ensue in the region. Cost-effectiveness analysis is often invoked in order to evaluate the
impact of this kind of assistance and cost-per-job or subsidy-per -job indices are invariably estimated
(Miller et.al. 1969, Hart et. al. 1993, Bangsund and Leistritz 1997). Welfare impacts and
distributional issues however, are often over-looked because the standard assessment frameworks
are exclusively efficiency-driven. This paper presents a new cost-benefit method and then applies it in
an empirical evaluation of a capital assistance program for small firms, highlighting the implications
for regional economic welfare.
We distinguish between regional economic ‘growth’ and regional economic ‘development’. The
former is measured in terms of an increase in regional product, employment and income. The latter
refers to who benefits from that growth,  the extent to which local welfare is really improved, and
how this change is distributed across sub-sections of the local population. It is their welfare impact
that constitutes the real regional benefit. Taking this perspective, the analytic framework has to go
beyond cost-effectiveness analysis to a cost-benefit approach. Cost-benefit is a particularly
appropriate tool in this instance. The capital program under consideration here is focused on small
firms in peripheral (and high unemployment) regions in Israel. Due to the presence of imperfections
(information asymmetries) in the capital market, small firms are denied access to funds despite the
fact that they might have viable business projects (Binks et. al. 1992). In such a case, a cost-benefit
approach would seem suitable for assessing a program that supports projects that may not seemviable when valued at market prices but are viable when valued using their alternative or shadow
price.
The paper proceeds in the following manner. The role of capital assistance to small firms is discussed
and its effects on job creation and regional welfare are analyzed.  This discussion serves to highlight
the importance of the structural characteristics of the regional labor market in determining the extent
to which regional welfare is really changed by a capital subsidy. The particular program under
consideration and the analytic method are then presented. This involves going beyond the attention
paid to the ‘deadweight’, ‘displacement’ and indirect effects which form the staple ingredients of
impact assessment. The proposed cost-benefit method represents a  significant advance on the cost-
effectiveness approach used in previous work (Felsenstein et. al. 1998). It  calls for discounting the
opportunity cost of labor from any regional income calculation and further adjusting this to account
for the occupational distribution of the employment created. In this respect, our cost-benefit account
deals with both issues of efficiency and distribution. This approach is warranted as the program has
well-defined equity objectives in addition to achieving greater efficiency in the market and redressing
imperfections. The measures of costs and benefits are discussed and the paper concludes with some
of the implications for regional development policy that arise from a specific focus on welfare effects.
2. CAPITAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS : A ROLE IN REGIONAL ECONOMIC
WELFARE ?
The starting point for any discussion of  the welfare impacts of a capital assistance program is to
address the question whether this form of support does in fact have any affect on employment (Buck
and Atkins 1976, Harris 1991). Ironically, capital subsidies rather than labor subsidies are those most
generally adopted for regional economic development.  The effect of capital assistance on jobgeneration can lead on the one hand to a substitution effect. Capital utilization increases at the
expense of labor and no extra employment is generated. On the other hand, the outcome of the
capital assistance can be that the firm operating efficiently at a fixed cost level will reduce costs,
allowing for a higher level of output at a given cost level (the output effect). Job generation will only
take place if the output effects of the capital assistance program are greater than the substitution
effects. Even if this is the case and capital assistance is employment-generating, the question still
arises as to whether a labor subsidy of an equivalent monetary value would result in even more
employment creation (Layard and Nickell 1980).
Intuitively, a capital assistance program for small firms would be expected to contribute to regional
welfare by creating jobs and income. When a subsection of the population have work and income at
their disposal, their economic well-being has become enhanced. However the link between regional
jobs and regional welfare is by no means obvious (Courant 1994). Programs for employment and
income generation are only positive if the costs of stimulating this growth are less than the benefits
arising from it.
Framing these benefits in a coherent way means recognizing that labor arising from an assisted
program should be treated as a benefit and not a cost. This is justifiable in high unemployment areas
on grounds of both efficiency and distribution. The efficiency objective is to mobilize labor in a
productive way. The distribution issue means recognizing that not all the income benefit arising from
a job can be credited to the program. The traditional economic view is that labor is a cost. Workers
demand wages as a compensation for leisure forfeited. They will supply their labor to the point that
the wage equals the marginal rate of substitution between income and  leisure. However, the welfare
gain to the worker from having the program-assisted employment will not be the remuneration paid
(i.e. the wage). It is the difference between the wage and that offered in the next best alternative, i.e.the opportunity cost of the labor. The wage thus indicates the value of alternative production
forfeited. For this reason, wages represent both a private and a social cost. As such, simply counting
jobs or payrolls may not reflect the benefits of the assistance program. What in fact is needed is a
method that looks at the level and distribution of local welfare arising from the program. Empirically,
the opportunity cost of labor is often equated with its ‘reservation wage’. This refers to the minimum
wage acceptable for entering into employment. High reservation wages suggest low welfare gains
and low reservation wages imply high considerable welfare effects. Both imply a shadow price for
labor different to the market price. Estimates of these wages vary greatly; from over 90 percent of
the real wage (Jones 1989, Sridhar 1996) to 65 percent (Swales 1997a).
New job creation can also be considered a benefit in terms of the chain reaction that it sets off in a
regional labor market (Felsenstein and Persky 1998). For example, a worker moving into new job,
‘A’, vacates his previously held job, ‘B’. This becomes available to another worker who frees up his
previous job, ‘C’. A chain of jobs is thus set in motion with the creation of new employment. The
welfare effect of the new job is the sum of the incremental gains at each link in the chain.
The structural characteristics of the regional labor market also play a major role in determining
whether an assistance program will have a welfare impact. Typically, regional economies are small
and open systems.  We can outline a three-fold typology of regional labor markets and the likely
effect of a  capital assistance program on their welfare.  First, if the regional economy is closed and
self-contained, then a capital assistance program that generates employment will not enlarge the size
of the economic development cake. It will simply shuffle the proportionate size of the pieces.
Opportunity costs of newly generated employment will be equal to wages achieved in prior
employment. In such a situation there will not be any real welfare gain (Haveman 1976).If, and more probably, the regional economy is an open system with inter-regional trade flows, then a
capital subsidy program that creates jobs in the region sets in motion a different dynamic. Inter-
regional migration will start to take effect as high demand locations receive factors of production
from places with over-supply. Regional product will start to grow. However, a rise in local product
does not necessarily mean a rise in local welfare, especially if new employment opportunities are
taken up by in-migrants. If the local labor market conditions are tight (full employment), then it is
likely that the in-migrants will be highly mobile workers with high opportunity costs. The net impact
on regional welfare will therefore be marginal.
Finally, in a Keynesian-type of labor market characterized by substantial unemployment and under-
employment,  program-generated employment is likely to be taken up by labor whose opportunity
cost is low. These costs are often equal to unemployment benefits and transfer payments. In this case
the program-generated employment could genuinely be creating a large regional welfare gain for that
segment of the population whose alternative is transfer payments. Regional labor market conditions
are therefore important in determining the level of regional welfare.
The above typology has also implied the importance of the occupational distribution of  program-
generated employment. Highly skilled jobs are likely to have high opportunity costs . At this level
there are many other alternative opportunities in the labor market. Labor markets are likely to clear
at wage levels close to the national level and workers compete nationally for jobs. They may be
indifferent to the actual location of the job itself. As such we cannot say that their welfare has been
considerably improved though program-generated employment. Jobs are more likely to go to in-
migrants for whom labor markets are national and not regional . Regional welfare effects are thus
likely to be limited.On the other hand, at lower skill levels, few alternative opportunities exist. Labor markets often do
not clear either nationally or regionally. The opportunity cost of labor is expected to be low and jobs
generated are likely to serve the local population. Regional welfare gains are therefore assumed to be
high. Workers for whom the only other viable alternative is unemployment may have their welfare
considerably improved through project-generated employment. The distribution of welfare impacts
therefore cannot be ignored.
A final issue affecting the regional welfare implications of the capital assistance program relates to
the supposed efficiency of small firms in generating employment. When the small firm is the target of
capital assistance this is intuitively perceived as a welfare-inducing due to employment benefits
assumed to ensue. This is especially the case where the program is aimed at redressing discrimination
in the capital market which results in private market decision-makers overlooking businesses on the
basis of characteristics unrelated to business viability such as ethnic origin and business location.
The roots of this are probably the disproportionate amount of minority, low-income and female-
owned businesses amongst this sub-population (Dewar, 1991 Bates 1993). Much of this perception
is a product of  political rhetoric and Birch’s early findings on the centrality of small firms in the ‘job-
generation process’ (Birch 1979). However, empirical evidence to the contrary over the course of
the late 1980’s and early 1990’s  (White and Osterman 1991, Harrison 1994) has done much to
remove some of the gloss from this image.
3. THE CAPITAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
This empirical findings presented here arise from a cost-benefit study of a capital assistance program
aimed at promoting regional entrepreneurship (henceforth the REP program) in peripheral areas inIsrael. The study looks at funds disbursed over the period 1993-1995 to over 800  projects. The
program itself was inaugurated in the aftermath of the mass Jewish immigration from the former
Soviet Union to Israel at the beginning of the 1990’s.  At the outset, it was designated as a form of
public assistance with a particular welfare function and was focused on the small business population
likely to be excluded from other sources of  small-firm funding such as commercial banks and the
national small business assistance program.
The particular capital assistance instrument used was a loan and loan guarantee program. This was
funded in the main by one of Israel’s largest NGO’s (the Jewish Agency ) through its department for
Rural and Urban Development and  was administered jointly by that organization in conjunction with
a leading commercial bank. The loan component of the program was subsidized (2-3 percentage
points below market rates over the course of the study period). The guarantee portion covered up to
40 percent of the loan and was essentially a measure of perceived risk. A higher level of loan
guarantee was demanded for projects that were perceived as  higher risk. Over the period of analysis,
while loan guarantees could cover up to 40 percent of an individual loan, the funding organization
made sure that its guarantee commitment for all loans at any given time was not larger than 25
percent. For each loan, personal capital backing of 25 percent (liquid deposit in the bank) was
desired and loans disbursed were linked to the cost-of-living index or to the dollar.
As noted elsewhere, this form of capital assistance is market-failure led (Binks et.al. 1992,
Felsenstein et.al. 1998). The case for public subsidies to promote economic development is usually
made when the private market fails to provide public goods, or where externalities or natural
monopolies are created (Bartik 1990). A further case where public subsidy can improve inefficiencies
is in the presence of information asymmetries. These can be great for small firms who can be
screened out of the financial institution’s credit ‘decision rules’ on the basis of location, age of firm,origin of founder and so on. In all these instances an information failure may have occurred that
causes discrimination against small firms in the capital market. This can affect firms that are located
in the ‘wrong‘ locations (i.e. in remote areas about which they have little knowledge)  are the
‘wrong’ vintage (i.e. too young) or are started by the ‘wrong’ population (i.e. new immigrants who
are an unknown quantity). Another ‘failure’ here is that of the firm that fails to distinguish itself from
the pool of credit applicants (Felsenstein et.al. 1998).
In contrast to this fund, a national small business assistance program also exists. This offers a loan
and guarantee package in which the loan is at market rates while the guarantee can cover up to 100
percent of the loan in certain cases. The REP program is thus a niche-oriented capital assistance
scheme aimed at those small firms excluded from the national program due to market imperfections.
Over the period studied, while the loan ceiling of the REP program stood at $75,000 the average
loan was closer to $25,000 (Table 1). The maximum loan period was 6 years with a grace period of
up to 2 years. Table 1 outlines further performance indicators for the program. As can be seen all tail
off over the period reflecting a decline in funds at the disposal of the program. In terms of the
welfare function at the basis of the fund, both new firms and those belonging to new immigrants
consistently received over 40 percent of  approvals for funding. These firms created 2696 jobs of
which 40 percent (1088) were new immigrants jobs. Using a difference-of-means test for the volume
of funding by year, earlier work has shown that the geographic distribution of approved assistance
seems to be consistently and significantly biased towards the more peripheral northern and southern
regions of the country; they received over 70 percent of funds in each of the three years (Felsenstein
et. al. 1998). In these regions unemployment rates ranged from 7 to over 14 percent, compared to a
national average of around 4-6 percent over the study period. The other 30 percent of approvals
went to pockets of deprivation in the more prosperous central region of the country. Ostensibly then,the fund can be viewed as meeting its niche-market mission and catering to those types of projects
for which a market failure can be said to exist.
Table 1 here4.  ANALYTIC METHOD AND DATA
There are various justifications for subjecting this capital assistance program to a cost-benefit test.
First, in view of the emphasis in the REP program on alleviating market failure, cost-benefit would
seem to be an appropriate analytical method.  Second, the welfare focus of this study makes cost-
benefit a suitable technique as it looks at the social and not just monetary account (Schofield 1987).
Furthermore, some of the welfare objectives of the REP program such as employment creation for
new immigrants may only be viable when valued at non-market prices. These kind of projects  would
not normally yield a market rate of return and public support for this type of program would be
considered inefficient if measured in these terms. However, when the opportunity costs of the
objective (such as the opportunity costs of new immigrant labor) are considered in a welfare
framework and are measured, for example, by reservation wages, this is likely to yield a very
different result. This also points to the centrality of any opportunity cost parameter in determining
the final cost-benefit account. Finally, a further justification is the  labor homogeneity issue (Swales
1997a). Cost-effectiveness analysis as commonly used in impact studies, is predicated on the
assumption that ‘a job is a job’. No consideration is made of the fact that labor is not a homogenous
input. The opportunity costs of  the various occupational levels of labor need to be differentially
discounted in a cost-benefit account.
Accounting for this heterogeneity also leads to the distributional consequences. If welfare effects do
in fact differ across occupational groupings we can see who benefits and who loses from any
program-induced employment. In all these respects the cost-benefit account is an improvement on
the more limited cost-effectiveness analysis. While accounting for ‘deadweight’  or ‘but-for-the
program’ impacts, displacement effects and indirect impacts, the latter makes no account for the
opportunity costs of labor, differential skill levels in employment creation and distributional
implications. Even though much of the standard calculus of cost-effectiveness analysis can beincorporated into the cost-benefit account, the latter is more than just an expanded method of cost-
effectiveness analysis. Conceptually and practically, an extra dimension to the analysis is added
through the incorporation of social and welfare effects.
The cost-benefit account is constructed in the following way. First the jobs account is constructed.
This takes total program reported employment (TE) and adjusts it downwards in order to account
for deadweight and displaced employment. Deadweight employment is subtracted first and from the
remaining employment, a displacement adjustment is calculated. This procedure avoids ‘double
discounting’; i.e. employment that is excluded from the analysis (as it is not ‘truly additional’) is not
available for reconsideration when calculating the displacement impacts. An employment multiplier is
then applied to this decreased figure. The construction of the deadweight (w) and displacement (d)
parameters has been described elsewhere (Felsenstein et.al 1998). Deadweight effects are estimated
by modeling the additional employment in the ith project as a function of a variety of indicators, such
as capital intensity of the project, total investment and amount of assistance. This estimation
procedure is performed twice; once with the assistance term included and once without. Summing
the differences between these two estimations for all cases gives an indication of the extent of the
deadweight employment. In this instance it is estimated as w= 0.24 (Table 2). Similar parameter
values have been reported in studies estimating the deadweight employment impacts of regional
policy assistance in Britain  (Wren 1987, Swales 1997b).
Displacement effects are calculated on the basis of  branch-level location quotients (L.Q.). The
assumption is that those sectors for which L.Q.<1.0 serve local markets and therefore displacement
of existing demand can be expected. The overall effect is estimated here as d= 0.64  (Table 2). While
displacement parameters reported in other studies are somewhat smaller (for example, 0.40 in Hart
et. al. 1993, and 0.33 in PACEC 1993), the reason for the larger adjustment adopted here is due tothe fact that much REP program assisted activity is in the service sector which serves local markets.
Displacement is therefore likely to be high. The resulting net employment is then expanded by an
average regional employment multiplier (me=1.66), generated by the Israel MRIO  (multi-regional
input-output) model (see Freeman et. al. 1990). Taken together, net employment (NE) is expressed
as;
NE = TE (1-w - (1-w)d ) me                                                                                      (1)
The main benefit of employment growth is increase in regional earnings. The next step is therefore to
convert job generation into wage gains. This increase is disaggregated by wage classes so that the
distributional effects of the REP program can be assessed. The opportunity cost adjustment for these
wage groups credits the highest earners (Group 1) with  25 percent of wage gain, the intermediate
level (Group 2) with 50 percent and the lowest earners (Group 3) with 100 percent.
The justification for these particular weights is grounded in opportunity cost theory that equates
higher unemployment levels with lower reservation wages. On the basis of the National Survey of
Incomes 1994 data file we estimate monthly wage as a function of socio-economic variables and the
and unemployment rate, as follows;
Yj =  a  +  b1 MART  +  b2 EDUC  +  b3 SEX + b4AGE  + b5 AGESQ + b6 UNEMP  +  e
where, Yj is monthly wage for the ith individual, MART is a binary dummy variable for marital status
(the reference group is ‘married’), EDUC is a binary dummy for higher education (the reference
group is ‘university educated’, SEX  (reference group is ‘female’), AGE (in years) and UNEMP is the
unemployment rate at the respondent’s place of residence.The estimated full form for the above model is:
Yi = 254.8
*  + 257.11MART
**  + 431.8EDUC




** ) +  (-44.3 UNEMP
** )
*= t-values for coefficients significant at the p<0.05 level
**= t-values for coefficients significant at the p<0.0001 level
n= 6832; R
2 = .20; F= 238.24 (signif. F = .0000).
All coefficients are highly significant and with signs pointing in the expected directions. For our
purposes, it is instructive to note that the unemployment coefficient yields a remarkably
consistent (negative and significant) result for all reduced forms of the above model. Thus we
can state that a 1 percent increase in unemployment will yield a reduction in monthly wage of
roughly $44. This represents slightly over 3 percent of average monthly wage ($1278). The
REP program  is targeted at regions with above average unemployment rates. For the study
period, average unemployment was around 4 percent and the REP program was geared to those
places with unemployment in the 4-14 percent range (that represented nearly half of all wage
earners). Assuming an unemployment average of 12 percent in these locations, leads us to the
conclusion that wages are roughly 25 percent less than elsewhere. We therefore assume that
while reservation wages equal actual wages for wage Group 1 nationally, in REP targeted
regions they are 25 percent less. The two other wage groups are then scaled accordingly with
50 percent of the earnings of wage Group 2 being counted and the full earnings of wage Group
3. This approach was felt to be preferable to using a general shadow wage coefficient that
obscures differences across wage classes.
 In addition, we make allowance for the  running-in period  for the projects supported under the REP
program. Empirically, many of these projects have been found to have a rather long gestation period(Felsenstein et.al. 1998). Consequently, wage benefits for all projects are taken as 25% in the first
year,  50% the second and with full credit thereafter. Tax benefits are then added to wage benefits to
complete the benefits account.  Firm revenues (R) are estimated from a national survey with detailed
sectoral information (CBS 1996a) and expanded by an appropriate output multiplier (mo) generated
by the MRIO model (as above). The value added tax rate (0.17) for this program-induced revenue is
counted as the tax benefit.  Overall benefits (B) of the program can therefore be expressed as;
B = (NE Y  ti) + R (mo)                                                                                              (2)
where  ti = labor opportunity costs and i = 1...3; t1  = 0.25,  t2  = 0.50,  t3  = 1.00
.
The cost side of the equation takes the opportunity costs of capital into consideration. The
opportunity cost of the loan ( dl) is taken as the difference between the commercial interest rate and
the subsidized program rate. Over the course of the study period the latter was on average 3 percent
below market rates (dl = 0.03). The opportunity cost of the loan guarantees was taken as the interest
rate on long-term government bonds and thus dg = 0.05. Consultations with the administrators of the
REP program and the commercial bank through which the funds were disbursed, yielded an
estimated program administrative cost (a) of 0.012. Empirically,  program defaults have averaged
slightly under 5 percent of loan disbursements. Estimations of similar magnitude for administrative
and default costs, have been reported elsewhere (Swales 1997a).   However, there is a sharp attrition
effect over time and the average hides the fact that the risk premium for loans is much higher at the
beginning of the borrowing period. For this reason the default parameter (b) is 0.10 for  the first year
, 0.07 for the second year and 0.048  thereafter. Finally, tax-raising costs, due to economies of scale
are taken as half of the administrative costs of the program (l=0.006). Costs can therefore be
summed up as;C =   L (bi +  dl + a) + G (dg + a) +  R (l)                                                                (3)
where bi = the default rate and i = 1...3; b1  = 0.10,  b2  = 0.07,  b3  = 0.048
The balance (P) is simply benefits minus costs;
P + B - C                                                                                                                          (4)
Table 2 here
The data for the analysis is in the main program-generated. For each assisted project extensive data
exists relating to the characteristics of the small firms and the loan such as employment, new
immigrant employment, value of total planned investment, size of loan and guarantee, loan terms,
economic sector, location and so on. Missing data and a rather strict screening process resulted in
usable data on 443 assisted projects. This process has been dealt with elsewhere and is built on using
the size of the loan guarantee as an indicator of risk and deadweight assistance, i.e. support given to
projects that would have gone ahead anyway (Felsenstein et.al. 1998). In order to ensure that the
welfare function of the program was met, firms that were not new and were not immigrant-owned
were also excluded in the present analysis. With the exception of some prominent pockets of
deprivation in the center of the country, firms located in the central region or in low unemployment
areas were also omitted.
The data were then augmented to include income data by income class, unemployment rate by
location and firm revenue data. These data were added for each project with income data coming
from the National Insurance Institute data on wages by location (NII 1995). For each project, the
place-based average was weighted by the national sector average. New immigrants incomes wereweighted on average as two-thirds of  the wages of resident Israelis across all occupational classes
(CBS 1996b). The three wage classes were derived from dividing the wage distribution according to
those wages that were greater than one standard deviation above the mean (Group 1), those that fell
in a band of plus/minus one standard deviation around the mean (Group 2) and those that were
greater than one standard deviation below the mean (Group 3).  Detailed data on firm revenues by
economic sector were taken from  the Central Bureau of Statistics Survey of  Revenues (CBS
1996a). This source is rich in detail for the service sector (often at the 3-digit level). This is
particularly useful for the analysis of a service-sector orientated program (such as the REP). This
sectoral distribution was then weighted by the regional concentration of the sectors in the national
distribution.
5. RESULTS
As can be seen from Table 3, the benefits of the REP program clearly outweigh the costs. This result
is not really surprising considering that we are dealing with a loan program that has to be repaid
(rather than a grant) and that has a reasonably low default rate. In addition, the inclusion of a large
proportion of wages on the benefits side also serves to highlight the benefits. As we have argued
however, this is perfectly defensible in view of the welfare focus of the program and the fact that the
main benefit of employment growth is the increase in regional earnings. Finally, as Bartik (1991) has
shown, program benefits are likely to exceed costs in areas where unemployment is reasonably high
and  program costs are relatively low. In these areas, the cost of leisure foregone is not really an
issue. Local and regional economic development programs can redistribute employment and incomes
to more needy regions to the extent that program benefits in these regions are greater than in other
(wealthier) regions.The interesting observations relate to the employment and wage accounts. Both are adjusted
downwards in order to reflect more faithfully the regional situation without the program. In the case
of employment generation, this results in a 55 percent reduction in the program-reported figure.
1226 jobs are credited to REP support out of an initial figure of 2696. In the case of wages,  gross
wage impacts are reduced by 52 percent once labor’s opportunity cost is accounted for. The largest
adjustments are for wage groups 1 (high) and 2 (intermediate). For the former, adjusting for
opportunity costs means a reduction of nearly $1.4m and for the latter a reduction of $3m. These
opportunity costs adjustments also give some insight into  distributional impacts. REP program
benefits seem to be concentrated in wage Groups 2 and 3. The bulk of all welfare gain is in the
former but it is also interesting to note that after the adjustment, the absolute size of the welfare gain
of the latter is slightly larger than that of the highest wage category (Group 1). Welfare benefits do
therefore seem to be addressing the target groups. In addition, the wage distribution is not normally
distributed but is skewed leftwards. This bulk of earners are found in the lower reaches of the
distribution while the bulk of earnings are in the higher reaches. It is precisely the former population
that the program aims to address.
The estimated tax benefits are not inconsequential but in the case of Israel, they represent a pure
form of transfer from the region to central government. In the absence of any local sales tax and in
the presence of a highly centralized governance system, regional fiscal autonomy in Israel hardly
exists. The tax account here refers purely to value added tax and does not include any measure of
local property and land betterment taxes which are the only sources of local and regional fiscal
independence.
The cost side of the balance sheet is rather more mundane.  As the REP program is loan and
guarantee-based the main cost is the opportunity cost of capital. This is of roughly the same
magnitude as the other major cost factor which is the risk premium of the program as represented bythe rate of defaults. Once the small firm is ‘up and running’ (here considered as year 3 of operation
and onwards), this premium reduces quite drastically.
Table 3 here
The summary decision criteria for the cost-benefit account appear in Table 4.  The ratio of benefits
to costs lies between 3.0 and 3.4 depending on the time span and discount rate adopted. The choice
of the appropriate social time preference rate is a subjective issue and therefore three alternative rates
are presented here. REP-supported projects are evaluated for five and ten-year time horizons. This
basically means that the net jobs calculated are assumed to be maintained over this period. The
magnitude of the present value of net benefits arising from these jobs, shows the program having a
positive regional effect. The present value of the stream of future benefits is also divided by total jobs
(1226) and direct jobs (738) in order to give a benefit-effectiveness indicator. These simple ratios
again highlight the positive contribution of the project on a per-job basis over the given time horizon.
A five year lifetime for a project will generate regional wage (and tax) benefits in the order of $25-
28,000 per job. As shown above, eighty-eight percent of this gain will be distributed amongst the
middle and low income classes.
Table 4 here
6. CONCLUSIONS
This analysis has shed some light on the role of finance capital in regional economic development. It
has attempted to move beyond simply counting increased employment, income and investment and
has tried to capture the regional welfare gains of the REP program by differentially weighting jobs at
different wage levels. This weighting system is not the result of any distributional preference. Itsimply arises out of the fact that jobs at lower wage levels have lower absolute opportunity costs.
The  approach is therefore efficiency based; the distribution of jobs affects the net increase of
regional welfare.
The distributional implications are important however. Regional economic development programs
are often touted as having redistributive effects without any real capability of analyzing whether this
is the case. Our analysis makes a first attempt at putting this argument on more solid footing. In
many respects it is only partial.  It only captures the welfare effects arising from the wage of the
individual worker and not the household which might be the appropriate unit for a welfare-based
analysis.  In addition, the whole accounting system is rather sensitive to size of the opportunity cost
adjustments made for the different wage classes.  While the ‘right’ level of adjustment is ostensibly
an empirical issue, in practice the few studies that have estimated these costs have produced wide-
ranging results.
What are the regional development implications of a targeted program such as the REP fund ? While
the above results show all benefit-cost ratios well above 1.0,  implying a real addition to regional
welfare, the question still arises as to the permanence of this development in the region. We have
assumed little inter-regional mobility and little influence of in-migrants. As the regions under
consideration are relatively distant from the main centers of population and job opportunities,  the
local populations less educated and the new immigrant population still involved in ‘settling down’,
these may be reasonable assumptions. Similarly, we assume that most employment goes to the local
unemployed or new entrants to the labor force and very little to locals that are already employed.
Again, this assumption holds for the specific circumstances of the study period, but may not be
defensible in the future. The more the peripheral regions develop into open systems especially in
labor market terms, the harder it become to capture welfare benefits regionally.The challenge therefore is twofold. In the first instance, the aim of a regional finance capital program
needs to be the stimulation and creation of regional value added. This may be easier to attain
amongst a population of small firms who have a heavy service-sector representation and a strong
regional orientation (the typical profile of a REP project). Second,  the evaluation of such a program
needs to be able to deal with structural change in the regional economy over time. Simply calculating
present benefits over a five or ten-year time horizon while ignoring change in labor market dynamics
over the same period, may not be sufficient.References
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Urban Studies, 24, 268-278.Table 1: Performance Indicators for the REP Small Business Loan
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Performance Indicators 1993 1994 1995
REP REP REP
No. of  requests approved 490 251 103
Total value of approved loans (M $) 11.1 6.8 1.7
Value of loans actually materialized (M $) 2.5 4.0 5.1
Value of average loan (Th. $) 22.5 27.1 16.8
Value of total investments for which
approval requested (M. $)
17.0
1 9.8 4.7
Geog. Distribution of approvals (%):
Center 23 19 24
North 30 34 32
South 47 47 44
Sectoral Distribution of approvals (%):
Agriculture 4 7 3
Industry 16 12 10
Services + Tourism 80 81 87
New firms as % of all approvals 47 30 43
New immigs. firms as % of all approvals 41 36 35
Rural-location firms as % of all approvals 22 26 20












me employment multiplier 1.66
mo output multiplier 1.77
w deadweight rate 0.24
d displacement rate 0.64
a administration cost 0.012
b default rate 0.10; 0.07; 0.048
1
l tax raising cost 0.006
t opportunity cost of labour 0.25; 0.50; 1.00
2
dl opportunity cost of loans 0.03
dg opportunity cost of guarantees 0.05
1.  Risk premium taken as 0.10 for Year 1, 0.70 for Year 2 and 0.048 thereafter.
2.  Opportunity cost-adjusted incomes for three wage groups: Group 1 (25%), Group




Initial Estimate - Project Reported 2696
Adjusted Employment
2 1226
2. Wage Account (M $)
1
Non-adjusted Wages 8.43
       Group 1  1.85
Group 2 5.99
         Group 3 0.59
   Adjusted by Wage Group 4.04
Group 1 0.46
Group 2 2.99
     Group 3 0.59
3. Tax Revenues (M $) 1.96
TOTAL BENEFITS (Adjusted wage + Tax) (B) 6.00
COSTS (M $)
1. Loan-opportunity Cost       .36
2. Guarantee-opportunity Cost .18
3. Administration Cost .14
4. Defaults
1 .58
5. Tax-raising Cost .06
TOTAL COSTS (C) 1.32
1. Discount Rate = 5%; estimated for project after ‘running-in’ period, i.e. from Year
3 onwards with incomes adjusted to account for opportunity costs only and default
rate taken as 0.048.




NPV Benefits-Cost ($ M) 14.7 13.5 12.6
Benefit-Cost Ratio 3.08 3.06 3.03
P.V. benefit per total job ($) 17,360 16,338 15,404
P.V. benefit per direct job ($) 28,839 27,141 25,589
10 Year Estimate
NPV Benefits-Cost ($ M) 29.7 26.6 23.9
Benefit-Cost Ratio 3.45 3.41 3.38
P.V. benefit per total job ($) 34,110 30,722 27,799
P.V. benefit per direct job ($) 56,665 51,036 46,181